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1 Introduction
There is ample evidence that positional concerns and status competition influence people’s prefer-
ences and behavior (Chao and Schor, 1998; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Luttmer, 2005;
Heffetz and Frank, 2011), and theoretical models that take this into account have proven to lead
to more sensible results, not only at the individual level but also in terms of welfare and policy
implications (Postlewaite, 1998; Rege, 2008; Truyts, 2010).
In this brief survey, I review a number of papers that investigate the economic consequences of
agents’ concerns for social status in two specific and closely related areas of research. The first
area pertains to how status concerns influence individual preferences for redistribution (hence,
taxation). The second area focuses on how optimal direct taxation should be designed when agents
care about their relative standing in the society.
Studies that have addressed the first research question have mainly pursued a positive analysis:
backed by empirical evidence that stems from international surveys, they argue that status concerns
may explain voting behaviors that appear detrimental to individual well-being if one only considers
monetary payoffs. Papers that fall into the second area of research instead adopt more of a
normative approach as they investigate the features of the optimal tax schedule when status
competition generates externalities and leads to inefficiencies.
I focus in particular on 12 recent papers that I perceive to be important in the recent literature on
the two topics of interest. This small sample of papers is well balanced: six investigate the impact
of social concerns on redistributive preferences and six study the issue of optimal direct taxation
when people care about their relative standing in the society. All of the papers that I discuss were
published in 2000 or later, and six of them were published in 2012 or later. In presenting and
discussing these contributions, I attempt to highlight the following two aspects of the analysis:
1) what is the relevant dimension of status competition that the authors consider (i.e., what is the
status-bearing object), and 2) which functional form the authors use to capture the notion of social
status.
2 Social Status and Preferences for Redistribution
The line of research that studies how social status concerns can shape individual preferences for
redistribution fits into the broader research agenda that aims to identify all of the determinants of
these preferences.
In this respect, standard models of political economy (see the seminal papers by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981)) advanced the notion of economic voting
(or pocketbook voting), which, in its basic formulation, identifies income as the sole driver of
individuals’ attitudes towards redistribution. According to these models, low-income individuals
should favor redistribution (“poor” agents gain from the redistributive scheme because what they
pay is less than what they get back), and high-income individuals should oppose redistribution
(“rich” agents pay more than what they get). From an empirical point of view, the negative relation
between income and support for redistributive policies has been studied extensively (see, for
instance, Fong (2001)). International surveys such as the World Value Survey, the European Social
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Survey, and the General Social Survey routinely collect information about respondents’ income and
their attitudes towards redistribution. These data make it possible to study how the two variables
relate, while also controlling for a number of relevant covariates (e.g., age, education, political
preferences). The data show that economic voting indeed describes the behavior of a large portion
of the population. However, the data also exhibit two systematic deviations from this paradigm.
Many members of the working class appear to be against redistribution; at the same time a sizable
fraction of the socioeconomic elite declare their support for relatively high levels of redistribution.
The magnitude and the robustness of these deviations, paired with the pronounced cross-country
heterogeneity that these surveys highlight, motivated the search for other factors in addition to
income that may possibly influence individual preferences for redistribution.1 These factors include
prospects of social mobility ((Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001), beliefs concerning returns
on effort (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), perception about the fairness of market outcomes (Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005), and a number of agents’ idiosyncratic characteristics such as their personal
histories (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), race (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005), and culture (Luttmer
and Singhal, 2011).
A number of studies have argued that social status concerns may also play a role in influencing
voters’ attitudes towards redistribution. There are many channels through which this effect can
flow. Clearly, redistribution modifies an agent’s disposable income and therefore his consumption
possibilities. As such, redistribution also affects the resources that the agent can devote to
conspicuous consumption, which is the standard way in which individuals signal their status.
Moreover, redistribution makes the society more equal and accordingly shrinks the distribution
of consumption. As such, it decreases the social prestige (social stigma) that high-income (low-
income) individuals experience when status is defined as a cardinal concept.2 Redistribution can
also affect ordinal status if it impacts individuals’ incomes in an inhomogeneous way and thus
modifies agents’ relative standing in the distribution. Finally, redistribution can also change the
relevance that the society attributes to different individual characteristics in determining status. It
can therefore benefit or harm voters based on their initial endowment of these characteristics.
In what follows, I explore and discuss these possibilities in more detail. Most of the papers that
I review in this section are theoretical. I start, however, with a discussion of an empirical paper
(Corneo and Grüner, 2002) that testifies that social status concerns do indeed influence agents’
preferences for redistribution.
Corneo and Grüner (2002) use survey data from the International Social Survey Programme to
evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces in driving agents’ support for redistribu-
tive policies. The three forces that these authors consider are: 1) The monetary consequences that
the redistributive scheme has on the individual (the authors call this force the ‘homo oeconomicus
effect,’ essentially economic voting), 2) How the scheme conforms with the agent’s public values
1 See Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for a review.
2 Social status is ordinal when an agent’s position in the society is fully determined by the rank that the agent occupies
in the distribution of consumption / possession of the status-bearing object. Social status is cardinal when an agent’s
position in the society also depends on the distance between his own level of consumption / possession and some
aggregate statistics of others’ level (say, the average in the population). Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008, 2014) show
that the two notions of social status are far from being equivalent and may actually lead to radically different model
predictions.
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and vision about how the society should be (the ‘public values effect’), and 3) How the policy
affects the agent’s relative consumption and living standard (the ‘social rivalry effect’). This last
force is clearly related to the notion of social status. The mechanism that the authors have in mind
is the following: individuals have different incomes, but they tend to mingle with people with
similar income (for instance by living in the same neighborhood). Society is therefore partitioned
into different income classes, and classes with higher income enjoy higher social prestige. Redis-
tribution shrinks the distribution of income and accordingly moves adjacent income classes closer.
As such, an individual of class k now has more opportunities to meet and interact with individuals
that belong to income classes k−1 (i.e., a bit poorer) and k+1 (i.e., a bit richer). The first effect
decreases the expected utility that the agent derives from social interactions, and the second effect
increases expected utility. If the total effect is negative, the agent should oppose redistribution;
if it is positive he should support it. Empirical results (the authors use standardized measures of
occupational prestige to define the social prestige that they attach to the various income classes)
confirm the sign and the significance of this relation. The hypothesis that the desire to obtain high
status shapes individual preferences for redistribution is therefore validated.3
Closely related to this study is another by the same authors: Corneo and Grüner (2000). Both
studies highlight the relevance of status effects in influencing agents’ redistributive preferences.
However, while Corneo and Grüner (2002) is an empirical paper, Corneo and Grüner (2000) is
mainly theoretical. Corneo and Grüner (2000) aim to rationalize a puzzling observation, namely
the fact that the possibility to express one’s own preferences about redistribution (i.e., the right to
vote about taxes) is more prevalent in countries that feature pronounced income inequalities. Given
that the income distribution is typically right-skewed (i.e., the median voter has an income below
the mean), why then people do not vote for more redistribution? To answer this question, Corneo
and Grüner (2000) propose a model in which economic inequality has an informational value that
makes it possible to infer agents’ unobservable characteristics (e.g., non-marketable skills such as
culture and taste) via their observable characteristics (e.g., consumption). It is this informational
value of inequality that limits the scope for redistribution; in a completely equal society all agents
would have the same consumption level, making it impossible to tell different agents apart. The
authors argue that it is this fear of losing their social status that keeps members of the middle class
from supporting more redistributive policies and makes them agree with the elites to support more
conservative taxation policies and therefore less redistribution. From a technical point of view,
Corneo and Grüner (2000) study a three-period model in which agents first vote on their preferred
level of redistribution, then consume their (post-redistribution) income, and finally voluntarily
match into pairs. The matching process follows the model of Cole et al. (1992) and features social
competition as the (unobservable) matching value of an individual is positively correlated with his
(unobservable) wealth endowment or gross income, which are status-bearing objects and are in
turn positively correlated with the agent’s (partially observable) level of consumption. The latter
therefore serves as a signal for status.4
3 For completeness, Corneo and Grüner (2002) find that also the two other forces, the ‘homo oeconomicus effect’ and
the ‘public values effect’, have significant explanatory power.
4 Ferrari (2018) extends the model by Corneo and Grüner (2000) by letting individuals signal their (ordinal) status
through the consumption of a conspicuous good. The game features different equilibrium profiles of conspicuous
consumption, which thus lead to different possible stratifications of the society in terms of redistributive preferences.
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A similar matching protocol has been used more recently by Levy and Razin (2015). These au-
thors study preferences for redistribution in a setting in which agents only interact with individuals
who belong to the same “club” (i.e., a partition of the society with respect to income). Levy and
Razin (2015) do not model status concerns explicitly. As such, they do not rely on any particular
(ordinal or cardinal) notion of social status. In their model, agents positively sort according to
their disposable income. This endogenously leads to social stratification, because agents spend
resources to access more prestigious clubs. Relevant examples include investments in the education
market (say, the choice of a pupil’s school) and in the marriage market. The sorting mechanism in
turn affects individuals’ preferences for redistribution. The intuition is that, by decreasing income
inequality, redistribution reduces the incentives to sort. In particular, Levy and Razin (2015) show
that when the distribution of gross incomes is relatively equal, all individuals up to the mean, and
most interestingly also some above, prefer full equality (i.e., maximum taxation) so to eliminate the
pressures to engage in costly sorting. On the contrary, high inequality in the distribution of gross
incomes may lead some individuals who are below the mean to oppose redistribution, because
sorting gives them the option of not getting stuck in “poor” clubs.5 The model by Levy and Razin
(2015) can therefore rationalize both deviations from pure economic voting (blue collar individuals
voting against redistribution, members of the elite voting in favor of it), albeit not simultaneously
and within the same society.
König et al. (2017) provide an alternative explanation as to why affluent individuals may
support redistribution. These authors focus on a specific form of redistribution, namely the public
provision of goods for which a market alternative also exists. Examples of this kind of redistribution
include education, childcare and housing. The intuition here is that rich individuals may support
public provision to maintain the private substitute elitist (though not necessarily of a better quality)
and therefore signal their social prestige. In terms of the model, König et al. (2017) assume
that citizens differ in their exogenous income, which is not directly observable, and they derive
utility from general consumption as well as from consuming a good they can either receive for
free from the government or decide to buy on the market. The two options entail different status
consequences that are endogenously determined as a function of the partition of the society into
public and private sector users. In particular, the status that an alternative generates is proportional
to the average income of the agents who use it. Affluent individuals then strategically support
public provision: the majority of less well-off agents will use the public alternative so that the
private alternative will be only bought by high-income families and therefore entail high social
prestige. An interesting feature of the model of König et al. (2017) is the fact that voters with
different incomes may support the same redistributive policy (i.e., the public provision of the
good). This finding is consistent with empirical evidence and survey data. However, the same
data highlight the simultaneous existence of another typical pattern: people with the same level of
income often support different redistributive policies. A paper that accounts for both patterns, and
5 Kim (2018) instead rationalizes the economic conservatism of the poor in a model in which agents have (ordinal)
positional concerns on consumption, they display last-place aversion (i.e., the disutility they experience in moving
from position k to position k+1 in the ranking is strictly increasing in k; see Kuziemko et al. (2014)), and their labor
productivity gets slightly perturbed by the introduction of new tax policies.
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it is therefore able to simultaneously rationalize both deviations from pure economic voting, is
Gallice and Grillo (2018a).
Gallice and Grillo (2018a) introduce a model in which agents are heterogeneous in two
dimensions: productivity and social class. Productivity determines an agent’s gross income. Social
class captures all of the factors that influence an agent’s social position after having controlled for
the income consequences that these factors generate. Examples of these factors include the agent’s
educational and cultural level and the social network that he inherits from his family. Gallice and
Grillo (2018a) then define social status as a weighted average of the agent’s relative standing in
the distributions of consumption and social class. The authors adopt a cardinal formulation of
status (which in their model is a multidimensional attribute) because individuals get extra utility
(disutility) that is proportional to the positive (negative) distance between the agent’s attributes
and the average values in the population.6 Redistribution impacts citizens’ well-being not only
because it reallocates resources from the rich to the poor but also because it endogenously affects
the weights that define the importance of consumption and social class in determining agents’
overall social status. In particular, a high level of redistribution makes consumption less salient
(and therefore simultaneously increases the weight attached to social class) since differences
across agents in that dimension will be less pronounced. Gallice and Grillo (2018a) characterize
the coalitions of heterogeneous voters that support any specific tax rate and show that, as status
concerns become more relevant, individual preferences for redistribution become more polarized.
Positional concerns can also drive an agent’s process of social identification within a certain
social group. This effect can in turn influence the agent’s redistributive preferences and cause the
individual to deviate from pure economic voting. This path is the one explored by Shayo (2009)
with his model of social identity. Contrary to the studies that I reviewed so far (but in line with
insights from social psychology), Shayo (2009) defines social status at the group level rather than
at the individual level. He uses a cardinal formulation: group status is given by a linear function of
the distance between some measure of the group’s achievement in the relevant dimension of social
comparison (e.g., wealth, income or educational achievements) and the analogous achievement of
some reference group. Shayo (2009) then defines the notion of social identification. An individual
identifies with a certain social group if he cares about the status of that group (perhaps up to the
point of sacrificing material payoff to enhance it) and wishes to conform to that group’s standards.7
Agents tend to identify with the groups they are more similar to and aspire to join high-status
groups rather than low-status groups. When social identification is at work, an agent may support
the redistributive policy that is more favorable to the group as a whole, even if this policy is not
necessarily the one that benefits him the most as an individual.8 Shayo (2009) considers two
6 Gallice and Grillo (2018b) adopt a similar cardinal notion in the context of educational choices. In particular, they
study how status concerns influence individual educational choices and inequality when the status-bearing object is the
agents’ educational level, their perceived ability, or their income. Gallice (2009) also investigates the consequences of
relative comparisons in terms of level of schooling on educational dynamics.
7 The sense of belonging to a group with a certain status, together with the related notion of social esteem, is thus what
matters to the individual, on top of his material payoff.
8 Klor and Shayo (2010) provide experimental evidence on this tendency. Luttmer (2001) uses instead survey data to
show that group loyalty, and in particular racial group loyalty, matters in determining individuals’ support for welfare
spending.
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social groups with which an agent can identify: his own social class or the nation as a whole. He
shows that poor individuals are more likely to identify with the nation and that this nationalistic
attitude decreases their support for redistributive policies. This pattern therefore also rationalizes
the puzzling observation that, in general, there is a negative relation between the relevance of
national identification and the level of redistribution.
To sum up, the papers that I surveyed in this section testify the relevance of social status
concerns in influencing individuals’ preferences for redistribution. In particular, status-seeking
behavior can help rationalize the systematic deviations from pure economic voting that international
surveys routinely display. Some of the people whose gross income is below the mean may oppose
high taxation because more redistribution could negatively impact on their status (say by lowering
the level of their social interactions, by decreasing the expected quality of their matches, or by
increasing the salience of some dimensions over which they are particularly weak). Similarly,
some of the people whose gross income is above the mean may support high levels of redistribution
as this could benefit their social standing (say by relaxing the pressures to engage in costly sorting,
or by preserving the exclusivity of their consumption choices). As the intertwinement of different
notions of social status, different status-bearing objects and different reference groups has only
begun to be unraveled, theoretical and empirical research in this area is likely to remain lively and
fruitful.9
3 Social Status and Optimal Direct Taxation
As noted in the Introduction, studies of how social status concerns may impact the design of
fiscal policies typically adopt more of a normative approach because they investigate how optimal
direct taxation should be adjusted to account for agents’ concerns for their relative standing. For
instance, status-seeking considerations may lead individuals to overindulge in the status-bearing
activity (e.g., consume too much of a positional good) and therefore move away from the first-best
solution (e.g., by inflating the labor supply so as to increase their consumption possibilities).
Moreover, status competition creates negative externalities on others; agents can improve their
relative standing only by climbing the social ladder, thereby automatically worsening the position
of someone else.10 Taxation can mitigate, or sometimes fully eliminate, these distortions. A
properly designed income tax can contrast agents’ desire to increase their labor supply, perhaps
discriminating across different types of individuals who face different incentives to engage in
social competition. Similarly, a Pigouvian tax on positional goods can force agents to internalize
the social costs that they generate by overspending in conspicuous consumption and accordingly
correct the negative externalities that social competition brings.
9 Ongoing studies on the topic also include Windsteiger (2017), who rationalizes the observation that redistributive
policies appear to get lower support as income inequality increases in a model in which people are segregated according
to income and misperceive the shape of the income distribution, and Antinyan et al. (2018), who use an agent-based
model to study the welfare implications of status competition and redistributive policies in an evolving social network.
10 The kind of social competition that I consider in this section involves all individuals, even those at the top of the
distribution of the status-bearing object. Thus, agents do not have an emulative behavior (sometimes labelled by the
‘Keeping up with the Joneses’ idiom) but rather a competitive one (‘Staying ahead of the Smiths’).
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The welfare-improving role that taxation can play when agents care about their relative position
in the society has long been recognized in the literature. Older studies that address this issue are,
among others: Duesenberry (1949), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Frank (1985),
Ireland (1994), Persson (1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997a), and Ireland (1998). In what follows,
I focus on more recent contributions. I concentrate on papers that model and investigate the
issue in a game theoretic setting as a simultaneous and one-shot interaction among individuals.11
However, even in this restricted temporal and methodological domain, relevant contributions
remain numerous and I will therefore only consider some of them.
In discussing this selected group of papers, I attempt to highlight how these studies address
the primary research questions underlying the literature on the topic. These questions can be
summarized as follows: how does the presence of status concerns modify optimal direct taxation
with respect to the conventional case in which these concerns are absent? Does the fact that
agents care about their relative standing call for a more or less pronounced progressivity of the
tax system with respect to the “standard” level of progressivity that simply stems out from the
decreasing marginal utility of income? Finally, which are the consequences that status concerns
brings about in terms of the shape (i.e., the concavity or convexity) of the optimal tax schedule?
As we will see, the answer to the first question is rather uncontroversial as it appears to be robust
to different matching protocols and different specifications of social status. The existence of status
concerns generally calls for an increase in taxation for all types of agents. This increase is justified
by a Pigouvian argument. It serves to realign the private and social costs that stem from social
competition and thereby eliminate the negative externalities that status concerns generate.12 The
answers to the second and third questions (effects on the progressivity and the shape of the optimal
tax schedule) are less univocal because they are sensitive to the formulation of social status that
one adopts.
The first paper that I discuss is Ireland (2001). This study investigates the issue of optimal
income tax in a model that features a social status signaling mechanism. In the model, individuals
choose their labor supply and signal their status via wasteful consumption expenditure. The
government observes the income profile and chooses the income tax schedule that maximizes
social welfare (a weighted average of individual utilities, where the weights are non-increasing
in agents’ types). Social concerns are captured by postulating that agents maximize a weighted
average of their actual utility and their utility as perceived by others, where the weight of the
second component is weakly increasing in agents’ type (i.e., higher types may be more concerned
about status than lower types). Assuming quasi-linear preferences in consumption and focusing on
the least-inefficient fully separating equilibrium, Ireland (2001) shows that, compared with the
conventional case in which status concerns play no role, the optimal tax policy is more progressive
11 Therefore, I exclude papers that study the intertemporal profile of optimal taxation in the presence of status concerns
and feature overlapping generations of individuals (Abel, 2005; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2010; Wendner,
2010).
12 Under some circumstances, the quest for status may actually incentivize activities that generate positive externalities.
Social competition can then counteract pre-existing distortions and lead to welfare improvements. See Corneo and
Jeanne (1997b) for an example about capital accumulation in an endogenous growth framework.
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because it features steeper tax functions for all agents.13 The tax system thus leads to more
redistribution. However, the analysis also shows that in general marginal tax rates do not have to
increase faster with agents’ types, which can actually only occur when the rich are more concerned
with status than the poor. Therefore, the optimal tax schedule is not necessarily more convex. As
Ireland (2001) puts it: “Status seeking justifies income taxation and higher marginal tax rate, but
not an increasing marginal tax rate”.
Corneo (2002) investigates the efficiency of progressive taxation when agents care about
relative income. This study illustrates the beneficial effects that progressive taxation may have as a
way to contrast the negative externalities that status concerns generate. The rat race triggered by
social competition leads to upward distortions in individuals’ labor supply because agents want
higher incomes to finance higher levels of consumption. Progressive taxation can restore efficiency
because those who strive the most to improve their status are high-income individuals and therefore
high marginal tax rates are necessary to prevent them from doing so. Corneo (2002) considers
a model in which agents are heterogeneous in terms of their time endowments, and therefore
earning potentials. He defines status as an ordinal concept: it is given by the agent’s rank in the
post-tax income (or equivalently consumption) distribution and can accordingly be measured by the
cumulative distribution function of income. This formulation leads to interesting results. It implies,
for instance, that the incentives to engage in status-seeking behaviors are stronger in more equal
societies because an individual can move up more in the social ranking when income differences
are limited. That is why the benefits of progressive taxation are larger when the distribution of
income in the society is more homogeneous; this situation is one in which individual incentives to
engage in social competition, and thereby upwardly distort their labor supply, are stronger. Indeed,
Corneo (2002) shows that, whenever income inequality is below a critical threshold, a progressive
income tax can even yield Pareto improvements: the poor enjoy a higher level of redistribution
while the rich save on the costs of the status race. In general, the author shows that a properly
structured progressive taxation can restore agents’ undistorted first-best labor supply. The amount
of progressivity (i.e., the steepness of the optimal tax schedule) that is necessary to achieve this
result decreases with inequality. The model accordingly provides an explanation as to why income
taxation appears to be more redistributive in countries that are relatively homogeneous in terms of
pre-tax income.
In an influential paper, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) delve into a similar topic. These authors
consider a simultaneous move game with incomplete information in which agents must decide how
much of their (unobservable) income to devote to the conspicuous consumption of a positional
good. Agents care about their absolute level of consumption as well as about their status, which is
determined by their ranking in the distribution of consumption of the positional good (therefore
status has an ordinal formulation). As a result, agents have to anticipate the amount that others
will consume and best respond to this guess. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) show that in the
symmetric equilibrium of the game, the distribution of consumption resembles the distribution of
13 On a related note, see also Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008). These authors show that concerns about relative
consumption lead to (substantially higher) marginal tax rates with respect to the conventional case in which these
concerns are absent. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) investigate the consequences of relative concerns not
only in terms of optimal income taxation but also in terms of public good provision (about this latter point see also Ng
(1987) and Wendner and Goulder (2008)).
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income because each agent has the same rank under both distributions. People over-spend in the
positional good but in equilibrium individual investments cancel out: agents are not able to change
their initial position and basically “run to keep in the same place”. In terms of policy implications,
the analysis reveals that taxing conspicuous consumption can improve social welfare because it
disincentives the race for status. In particular, Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) show that as income
becomes more homogeneous the marginal tax rate on middle incomes should rise. Like Corneo
(2002), the intuition is that a low level of income inequality fosters social competition because
agents that are in the middle of the distribution can more easily outperform a large numbers of
their peers (see also Hopkins and Kornienko (2009)). However, the tax rate on high incomes (and
under certain conditions also the rate on low incomes) should fall because at the extremes of the
distribution the incentives to improve one’s own rank are lower. The optimal tax schedule therefore
discriminates among agents by targeting the different level of social competition they face rather
than their expenditure on conspicuous consumption (which is increasing with the agents’ income).
Hence, the analysis by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) challenges the idea that progressive taxation
is necessarily the optimal policy when people display status concerns.
Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012) elaborate on these insights and convincingly demonstrate an
important result: the equilibrium outcomes of models that feature status concerns, and therefore
also their policy and welfare implications, strongly depend on the shape and the properties
of the status function. In their model, “rich” and “poor” individuals have a non-observable
endowment of resources (the status-bearing object). The authors deliberately avoid defining these
resources precisely because they can take on different meanings (e.g., income, consumption,
wealth) depending on the context. Agents can signal their status by spending on a conspicuous
good. However, these expenditures are socially wasteful. Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012) consider
two different functional forms for status. The first one is an ordinal notion that only depends on
the agent’s rank in the distribution. The second one is a cardinal notion that also takes into account
the distance between an agent and the other agents. Within such a framework, Bilancini and
Boncinelli (2012) analyze the effects of redistributive policies in favor of the poor. Consistent with
the findings of Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), they show that with ordinal status, redistribution
boosts social waste because it shrinks the consumption distribution and thereby fosters social
competition. However, if status is cardinal an additional effect kicks in because a more compressed
distribution lowers the social prestige (respectively, social stigma) that people perceived to be
rich (respectively, poor) enjoy. This second effect reduces the incentives to signaling and, if it
overcomes the first effect, may actually lead to a reduction in social waste. When this is the case
and the reduction in social waste is sizable, more redistribution from the rich to the poor (i.e., a
more compressed income distribution) may even lead to a Pareto improvement because the rich
can get compensated for both the loss of resources and the loss of status that they suffer.14 A part
from these specific findings, the important message that Bilancini and Boncinelli (2012) convey is
14 Bilancini and Boncinelli (2018) deepen the analysis by focusing on the case in which labor income is the status-
bearing object (and still provides the agent the purchasing power to buy the conspicuous good). They show that in such
a framework the (positive or negative) effects of income taxes in reducing social waste depend in an even more complex
way on the combination between the distribution of pre-tax wages and the social norm about status (ordinal status vs.
cardinal status).
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that, even if one is convinced that in a certain context status considerations are at work, the choice
of which notion / functional form of status to adopt is not inconsequential.15
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013) enlarge the scope of the analysis by studying the issue
of optimal direct taxation in a context in which both consumption and leisure are conspicuous goods
that convey status (though consumption is possibly more salient). The authors introduce a model
in which individuals must decide their labor supply while caring about their absolute and relative
levels of consumption and leisure. Status is a cardinal notion and is measured by the distance
between the agent’s consumption and time spent on leisure and the average values in the population.
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013) show that in such a context a progressive tax schedule
on income is the optimal policy.16 As in other models, a higher level of taxation with respect to a
setting in which social status plays no role serves the purposes of internalizing the externalities that
concerns about relative consumption generate. Progressivity then stems from the positional nature
of leisure: as agents increase their labor supply to boost their consumption (thereby generating a
negative externality on others in the consumption dimension), they necessarily have to reduce their
time spent on leisure (thereby generating a positive externality in the leisure dimension, which
accordingly offsets, but only partially, the negative externality in the consumption dimension).
However, to sustain any given level of consumption, low-ability (i.e., low-income) individuals
must decrease their amount of leisure by more than high-ability agents. The optimal marginal tax
rate must therefore be higher for high-ability individuals to account for the fact that the positive
externalities that these individuals generate by decreasing their amount of leisure is lower.
Finally, Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) focus on how the relevance of relative concerns impacts
optimal direct taxation. They study a model in which consumption is the object of social compar-
isons, individual status is measured in a cardinal way because it depends (positively or negatively)
on the (positive or negative) distance from the population average, and the government taxes
income with the goal of maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function.17 Consistent with Ireland
(2001) and Corneo (2002), the authors’ results confirm the general finding that higher marginal tax
rates improve efficiency when people have status concerns. In particular, Kanbur and Tuomala
(2013) show that stronger concerns for one’s own relative position increase the progressivity and
the convexity of the optimal tax schedule. Interestingly, Kanbur and Tuomala (2013) also study
how the level of inequality in the society affects the impact of the salience of relative concerns on
optimal taxation. Using some specific functional forms and numerical simulations, Kanbur and
Tuomala (2013) show that higher inequality reduces the positive impact of the degree of relative
concerns both on the level and on the steepness of the optimal marginal tax rate schedule. However,
and as the authors first advocate, more research is needed on this issue to better understand the
generality of this relation and disentangle the various forces at play in it.
15 I again refer the reader to Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008, 2014) for some clear examples about how different
formulations of ordinal and cardinal status can substantially impact the results of the analysis.
16 Mujcic and Frijters (2015) derive similar implications in a model in which consumption and health are conspicuous
goods. These authors use survey data from Australia to show that health is indeed a status-bearing object.
17 See Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018) for an analysis of the case in which the government instead adopts a
paternalistic approach and thereby does not internalize the welfare effects of relative consumption in the social objective
function.
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To summarize, all papers in this area of research highlight the distorsive effects that status-
seeking behavior may have both at the individual and at the aggregate level. Agents tend to spend
too much in positional goods and may thus push their labor supply above the first-best solution.
The externalities that stem from the rat-race effects that are inherent to social competition further
exacerbate the problem. All papers also recognize the role of taxation to mitigate these effects.
The optimal tax policy depends however on a number of context-specific characteristics, among
which the level of pre-tax inequality and the relevant notion of social status prominently stand out.
4 Conclusions
I have reviewed recent studies investigating how concerns about one’s own relative standing
in the society affect individual attitudes towards redistribution and the design of optimal tax
policies. In both contexts, status considerations lead agents to behave differently with respect
to the optimal behavior they should adopt if only monetary payoffs were relevant. Models that
explicitly acknowledge the importance of status concerns in driving individual decisions can thus
provide a better description of agents’ actual behavior. In particular, these models can rationalize
patterns of behavior that would otherwise appear to be suboptimal. The papers that I reviewed
demonstrate, for instance, that social competition can explain why a non-negligible fraction of
the population supports redistributive policies that harm them from a purely monetary point of
view. Similarly, they show that status-seeking behavior may influence agents’ labor supply, bias
their consumption habits, and accordingly call for specific tax interventions on the side of the
government to counterbalance these distortions and improve efficiency. Current research about the
role that status concerns may play in these contexts is lively and will certainly lead to a wider and
sharper array of sensible policy implications.
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